Crude oil and gasoline prices: an asymmetric relationship? by Nathan S. Balke et al.
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Gasoline accounts for about half the U.S.
consumption of petroleum products, and its
price is the most visible among these products.
As such, changes in gasoline prices are always
under public scrutiny. Many claim to observe an
asymmetric relationship between gasoline and
oil prices—specifically that gasoline prices
respond more quickly when oil prices are rising
than when oil prices are falling (Figure  1).
President George Bush gave these concerns
official weight during the Gulf War when he
asked the oil companies to show restraint in
raising prices for their products.
Much of the previous research provides
econometric support for public claims of asym-
metry in the movements of gasoline and crude
oil prices. Bacon (1991) found asymmetry in the
U.K. gasoline market, and Karrenbrock (1991),
French (1991), Borenstein, Cameron, and Gilbert
(1997), and a GAO report (1993) all found some
evidence of an asymmetric response in U.S.
gasoline markets. Norman and Shin (1991) found
a symmetric response in U.S. gasoline markets.
Of these studies, one of the most compre-
hensive and compelling is that of Borenstein,
Cameron, and Gilbert (1997), hereafter identi-
fied as BCG. They use a series of bivariate error-
correction models to test for asymmetry in price
movements in each of the various stages in the
production and distribution of gasoline from the
crude oil price through the refinery to the retail
pump, using weekly and biweekly data from
1986 to 1992. They find strong and pervasive
evidence of asymmetry.
As Shin (1992) has argued, however, the
periodicity of the data, the sample period of
estimation, and the model specification may
have affected the results obtained in previous
studies. To explore these issues, we extend the
work of BCG by using several different model
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respond more quickly when 
oil prices are rising than when 
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specifications with weekly data from 1987
through early 1996. We find that most of the
price volatility originates upstream. We also find
econometric evidence of asymmetry in the
extended sample. The findings are sensitive to
model specification but not to sample period.
Although popular opinion attributes asym-
metry to market power, a number of competing
explanations have been offered. This article pre-
sents an econometric exercise that attempts to
identify whether asymmetry occurs; it does not
address how asymmetry might arise. For an
overview of the possible explanations, see the
box entitled, “Why Does Asymmetry Arise?”
THE ORIGINATION AND TRANSMISSION 
OF PRICE SHOCKS
In theory, price shocks can originate at any
point from crude oil prices to the final price at the
gasoline pump. Shocks originating at an inter-
mediate step, such as the wholesale price of gaso-
line, may reflect a bottleneck in distribution,
while price shocks originating farther upstream
are more likely to represent the effects of varia-
tion in crude oil supply. Price shocks originating
at the retail level are more likely to represent
variation in U.S. demand for gasoline. Given the
history of oil-supply shocks and indications that
demand for gasoline is relatively stable, intuition
suggests that price shocks are more likely to orig-
inate upstream and be transmitted downstream.
To examine where price shocks originate
and how they are transmitted across the U.S.
market for gasoline, we use time-series methods.
Specifically, we test for Granger causality and
compute variance decompositions for each pair
of upstream and downstream prices, including
spot crude oil prices and spot, wholesale, and
retail gasoline prices. As reported below, both
the causality tests and variance decompositions
generally confirm the intuition that price shocks
more frequently begin upstream and are then
transmitted downstream.
To motivate the relationship between a
pair of upstream and downstream prices, con-
sider a simple markup model,
(1) PDt = a + bPUt,
where  PDt is a downstream price, PUt is an
upstream price, and a and b are parameters
indicating the relationship between the up-
stream and downstream prices.
1 The markup, a,
represents the cost of refining, marketing, trans-
portation, and/or distribution. The scalar, b,
allows for differences in units and heat content
but may also reflect other market phenomena.
The time-series analysis involves several
steps. We check whether the prices are station-
ary. We then test for Granger causality, which
allows an assessment of the lead–lag relation-
ship between each pair of prices. Finally, we
calculate the variance decompositions to assess
the sources of shocks to the variables.
Data
To analyze the relationships between crude
oil and gasoline prices, we use weekly data from
January 1987 through August 1996. The oil price
is the spot price for West Texas Intermediate
crude, the spot price for gasoline is the New
York Harbor Spot Price for unleaded regular,
and the retail price is the self-service pump
price for regular unleaded motor gasoline, with
and without taxes. These series are obtained
from the Weekly Energy Statistics of Haver Ana-
lytics. The wholesale price is from the Oil Price
Information Service and represents an average
wholesale price for unleaded gasoline across all
U.S. wholesale distributors reporting data con-
tinuously from 1986 through August 1996.
Stationarity
As an initial step in our econometric work,
we perform several diagnostic checks to assess
the correct specification for the various series. We
test for nonstationarity using augmented Dickey–
Fuller and Phillips–Perron tests and conclude
that we can reject the hypothesis that the series
have a unit root. Because all our price series
appear to be stationary, we represent the rela-
tionship between any pair of prices in log levels.
Causality
A causal relationship between two vari-
ables implies that changes in one variable lead
changes in the other. To assess the lead–lag
relationships for each pair of variables, we per-
form bidirectional Granger causality tests on
each of the ten pairs of upstream and down-
stream prices as follows:
where PDt is the downstream price; PUt is the
upstream price; a1, b1,i, d1,i, a2, b2,i, and d2,i are
parameters to be estimated; and m1,t and m2,t are
white-noise residuals. The lag length used for
estimation of each equation is the shortest lag
length that yields white-noise residuals (as indi-
cated by the Ljung–Box Q statistic with a prob-
ability of 10 percent).
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Why Does Asymmetry Arise?
With a number of studies showing that gasoline prices respond more quickly when crude oil prices rise 
than when they fall, analysts have offered a number of explanations for the phenomenon.
1 Explanations include
market power, search costs, consumer response to changing prices, inventory management, accounting prac-
tices, and refinery adjustment costs. For the banking industry, Neumark and Sharpe (1992) show that market
concentration is an explanatory variable for the asymmetry found in interest rate movements. For the gasoline
markets, however, no one has posited econometric tests that would allow the testing of the various explanations
(including market power) for price asymmetry against the available data. Without such tests, it remains a matter
of speculation whether the asymmetric response of gasoline prices to movements in crude oil prices is the result
of market power or more benign forces.
Market Power and Search Costs
Market power is probably the greatest concern to those who observe that gasoline prices respond more
quickly when crude oil prices rise than when they fall.Yet no formal model shows a relationship between market
structure and asymmetric response of downstream prices to changes in upstream prices.
2 Were such a model to
exist, it might involve firms that are concerned with maintaining a tacit collusion and/or consumer search costs.
Consider an industry with a few dominant firms that are engaged in an unspoken collusion to maintain
higher profit margins. Reputation can be important to maintaining such a tacit agreement (Tirole 1990). If the
firms value the tacit agreement and have imperfect knowledge of the upstream prices its competitors are paying,
then each firm would face an asymmetric loss function in which it would be more reluctant to lower its selling
price than to raise it. When upstream prices rise, each firm is quick to raise its selling prices because it wants to
signal its competitors that it is adhering to the tacit agreement by not cutting its margin. When the upstream price
falls, each firm is slow to lower its selling price because, in doing so, it runs the risk of sending a signal to its
competitors that it is cutting its margin and no longer adhering to the tacit agreement. In the gasoline markets,
such an explanation could be applied to each upstream price and its adjacent downstream price.
In the retail gasoline market, consumer search costs could lead to temporary market power for gas stations
and an asymmetric response to changes in the wholesale price of gasoline. (See BCG, Norman and Shin 1991,
Borenstein 1991, and Deltas 1997.) Each gas station has a locational monopoly that is limited only by consumer
search. After consumers have searched, the profit margins at each gas station are pushed down to a roughly
competitive level. When wholesale prices rise, each station acts to maintain its profit margins and quickly passes
the increase on to customers. When wholesale prices fall, however, each station temporarily boosts its profit mar-
gins by slowly passing the decrease on to customers. Only after the customers engage in a costly and time-
consuming search to find the lowest prices are the stations forced to lower prices to a competitive level.
More Benign Explanations
Although the existence of asymmetry could be consistent with market power, it is not the only explanation
that economists have offered for the asymmetric response of gasoline prices to movements in crude oil prices.
Alternative explanations include consumer response to changing prices, inventory management, accounting
practices, and refinery adjustment costs.
An asymmetric consumer response to changing gasoline prices may contribute to the asymmetry between
movements in crude oil and gasoline prices. If consumers accelerate their gasoline purchases to beat further
increases when its price is rising, they will increase inventories held in automobiles and quicken the pace at
which the price rises. If consumers fear running out of gasoline and do not slow their purchases of it when its
price is falling by as much as they accelerated their purchases when prices rose, then the price of gasoline will
fall more slowly than it rose.
Similarly, firms in the oil industry may view the short-run costs of unexpected changes in their inventories 
as asymmetric. (See BCG.) If the costs of operations rise sharply when inventories are reduced below normal
operating levels, a reduction of upstream supply could lead a firm to raise its output prices aggressively to pre-
vent a loss of inventories. If an increase in inventories above normal operating levels has a relatively small effect
on costs, the firm could be less aggressive in reducing its selling prices when it experiences an increase in
upstream supply. Hence, inventories would buffer downstream price movements less when prices are rising 
than when they are falling.
The asymmetry arising from changes in inventories could be enhanced by FIFO (first in, first out) account-
ing. If inventories fall when upstream supply is reduced, the firm will sell the products incorporating the higher
upstream price sooner. If inventories rise when upstream supply is increased, the firm will sell the products 
incorporating the lower upstream price later.
Refiners also face high adjustment costs to changing their output, and, when possible, they slowly adjust out-
put. When crude oil supplies are reduced and inventory reductions are costly, however, refiners as a group have
little choice but to reduce output quickly, which would lead to fairly quick increases in gasoline prices. When crude
oil supplies are increased, however, refiners slowly increase output, delaying the decreases in gasoline prices.
Notes
1 Pricing asymmetries have been observed in a number of industries, including banking (Neumark and Sharpe 1992) and agricul-
ture (Mohanty, Peterson, Wesley, and Kruse 1995).
2 Variations of the kinked-demand model of oligopoly do not suggest an asymmetrical movement in the output price of an industry
in response to common shocks to the input prices of the firms in that industry. See Scherer (1980) and Neumark and Sharpe
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Causality runs from the upstream price 
to the downstream price if the coefficients b1,i
are jointly significantly different from zero.
Similarly, causality runs from the downstream
price to the upstream price if the coefficients b2,i
are jointly significantly different from zero.
In most cases, upstream prices seem 
to contain market information that is later
incorporated in the downstream prices. As
Table 1 shows, we find that causality runs
from the upstream price to the downstream
price for each pair, with two exceptions. The
spot price for crude oil does not appear to
lead the spot price for gasoline, nor does the
retail price of gasoline without taxes seem 
to lead the retail price of gasoline including
taxes. We do find, however, that the spot
price for gasoline leads the spot price for
crude oil, and the retail price including taxes
leads the retail price excluding taxes. These
findings suggest the possibility that for these
two pairs of prices, information is incor-
porated in the downstream price a bit more
quickly than in the upstream price. We also
find that each of the gasoline prices Granger-
cause the spot price for crude oil, which sug-
gests that each of these prices contains market
information that is later incorporated into the
spot price for crude oil.
2
Long-Run Sources of Variance
To find out which price shocks have been
sources of volatility during the sample period,
we construct a bivariate vector autoregressive
(VAR) model to represent each relationship and
calculate the variance decomposition for each
pair of prices.
3 For given time horizons, the vari-
ance decomposition apportions the stochastic
variability in a given price to shocks originating
in itself and to shocks originating in the price
with which it is paired. We consider a 30-week
time horizon, which should represent the long
run because the variance decomposition shows
a minimal change after 30 weeks.
As Table 2 shows, the variance decompo-
sitions generally suggest that over the long run,
price shocks originate in upstream prices and
are transmitted downstream. In addition, the
variance decompositions suggest that proximity
enhances the importance of the upstream price
as a source of variation in a downstream price.
The one exception is in the relationship be-
tween the spot price for crude oil and the spot
price for gasoline. In its pairing with the spot
price of gasoline, the spot price for crude oil
accounts for about one-half of the variance in
the gasoline price over the long run. In its more
distant pairing with the wholesale price of gaso-
line, the spot price of crude oil accounts for
about two-thirds of the variance in the gasoline
price over the long run.
A BASIC MODEL OF ASYMMETRY
Given the findings that price volatility most
often originates in the upstream price of any
price pair and that causality is stronger going
from upstream prices to downstream prices, we
restrict our inquiry to those cases in which the
downstream price is the dependent variable and
the upstream price is the independent variable,
as is suggested by Equation 1. The relationships
between upstream and downstream prices, cou-
pled with the finding that each of the variables
is stationary, suggest modeling asymmetry in
levels as follows:
where Ut – i is a variable that takes a value of one
when PUt – i is greater than PUt – i – 1 and is zero
otherwise; Dt – i is a variable that takes a value of
one when PDt – i is greater than PDt – i – 1 and is
zero otherwise; a, bi, gi, di, and li, are parame-
ters to be estimated; and mt is a white-noise
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Table 1
Significance of Granger Causality Tests
(Variable at left is the dependent variable)
Spot Retail Retail
Oil gasoline Wholesale without tax with tax
Oil — .014 .015 .024 .049
Spot gasoline .53 — .176 .097 .229
Wholesale .002 .0 — .455 .088
Retail without tax .0 .0 .0 — .0
Retail with tax .0 .0 .0 .0 —
Table 2
Decomposition of Variance
(Percentage of forecast error variance of dependent variable explained 
by shocks to independent variable)
Spot Retail Retail
Oil gasoline Wholesale without tax with tax
Oil — 18.1 2.7 4.4 .21
Spot gasoline 48.9 — 1.8 .47 .65
Wholesale 63.5 85.8 — .15 .53
Retail without tax 63.3 84.7 87.2 — .47
Retail with tax 45.8 42.8 83.7 91.5 —
NOTE: The variance decompositions are from bivariate VARs.The variable at left is the depen-
dent variable.The pair orderings are from upstream to downstream.6
residual.
4 To facilitate comparison with BCG and
to control for seasonal and time-varying pricing
patterns, we include 51 weekly dummies and a
time-trend variable in each regression.
5 The lag
length used for estimation is the shortest lag
length that yields white-noise residuals.
The regression’s specification allows for
asymmetry in the response of the downstream
price to arise either from its own history or from
the upstream price. Asymmetry is indicated if
the coefficients di and li are jointly significantly
different from zero.
Table 3 indicates that symmetry is rejected
in half the price pairs at the 5 percent signifi-
cance level, but the results are not very sys-
tematic. For instance, the tests indicate that 
retail prices for gasoline, both with and without
taxes, respond asymmetrically to crude oil
prices, while the retail price with taxes responds
asymmetrically to the spot price for gasoline,
but the retail price without taxes does not. In
contrast, the retail price of gasoline without
taxes responds asymmetrically to the wholesale
price, but the retail price with taxes does not. 
In two of the pairings—spot gasoline with 
retail including taxes and wholesale with retail
without taxes—the asymmetry seems to arise
from the dependent variable’s own dynamics.
The lack of consistent results makes it difficult
to determine in which stages of the market
asymmetry arises. In addition, dynamic simula-
tions indicate that for those cases in which
asymmetry is statistically significant, it is rela-
tively small.
These findings contrast with those of BCG,
who find pervasive evidence of asymmetry that
is large in magnitude, using data from 1986 to
1992. We use a shorter sample, 1987–92, and
find it has no effect on the results.
AN ALTERNATE SPECIFICATION
Because the sample period used for esti-
mation does not seem to explain the difference
between the results above and those of BCG,
we consider the differences between the speci-
fication of Equation 4 and that used by BCG. A
model similar in specification to that used by
BCG yields substantially different results from
the levels model.
Having found that the shorter data series
they utilized are difference stationary, BCG uses
an error-correction model similar to Equation 4
for estimation. Allowing for asymmetry, includ-
ing in the error-correction process, one repre-
sentation of the error-correction model is
where DPDt is the first difference of PDt, the
downstream price; DPUt is the first difference of
PUt, the upstream price; a, bi, ci, di, fi, and y are
parameters to be estimated; z is the estimated
parameter from the long-run relationship be-
tween PDt and PUt; and mt is a white-noise re-
sidual.
In estimation, however, BCG do not make
use of the long-run restriction implied by the
error-correction process, as the coefficients on
the levels variables in their specification are left
unrestricted, despite finding that their data
series are difference stationary. Therefore, in the
absence of asymmetry, their model would be
equivalent to the levels model shown in
Equation 4. Like BCG, we do not impose a long-
run restriction in the estimation (which would
not be supported by stationary data), but unlike
BCG, we allow for asymmetry in the levels vari-
ables of the error-correction process, which
allows us to rewrite Equation 5 as
where a, bi, gi, zi, hi, d, and l are parameters to
be estimated, and mt is a white-noise residual.
6
As with Equation 4, we include 51 weekly dum-
mies and a time-trend variable in the regression.
The lag length used for estimation is the shortest
lag length that yields white-noise residuals. As is
the case for Equation 4, the specification of Equa-
tion 6 allows for asymmetry in the response of
the downstream price to arise either from its own
history or from the upstream price. Asymmetry
is indicated if the coefficients di, li, z, and h are
jointly significantly different from zero.
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Table 3
Significance of Asymmetry Tests for Levels Model
(Variable at left is the dependent variable)
Asymmetry Spot Retail
type Oil gasoline Wholesale without tax
Spot gasoline Indep.Var. .075 — — —
Total .109 — — —
Wholesale Indep.Var. .239 .011 — —
Total .097 .0 — —
Retail without tax Indep.Var. .0 .42 .08 —
Total .0 .24 .013 —
Retail with tax Indep.Var. .0 .89 .35 .15
Total .0 .048 .067 .28FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS       7 ECONOMIC REVIEW  FIRST QUARTER 1998
Although Equation 6 differs from Equation
4 only in its specification of asymmetry, estima-
tion with Equation 6 indicates more pervasive
asymmetry.
7 As Table 4 shows, symmetry is
rejected in nine of the ten price pairs. The error-
correction specification barely rejects the hy-
pothesis that the retail price of gasoline without
taxes responds asymmetrically to the spot price
of gasoline, but this is the only pairing in which
asymmetry is not indicated. In two pairings—
spot gasoline with wholesale and wholesale
with retail without taxes—asymmetry seems to
arise from the dependent variable’s own
dynamics. The pervasive asymmetry indicated
by the error-correction model is consistent with
the findings of BCG. Use of a shorter sample
period, 1987–92, does not significantly affect
the results.
The Magnitude of Asymmetry
To assess the extent of the asymmetry
implied by the two models, we examine the
response of the downstream price to both a per-
manent one-time increase in the upstream price
and to a permanent one-time decrease in the
upstream price. Figures 2 through 6 plot the 
differences between the downstream price’s
response to an increase and to a decrease in the
upstream price.
8 The solid line in each figure
represents the point estimate of the response,
and the dashed lines represent a confidence
band of two standard deviations.
9
Figures 2 through 6 show that the asym-
metry implied by the error-correction model is
substantially different from that implied by the
Table 4
Significance of Asymmetry Tests for Error Correction Model
(Variable at left is the dependent variable)
Asymmetry Spot Retail
type Oil gasoline Wholesale without tax
Spot gasoline Indep.Var. .004 — — —
Total .004 — — —
Wholesale Indep.Var. .004 .08 — —
Total .001 .0 — —
Retail without tax Indep.Var. .0 .21 .06 —
Total .0 .08 .007 —
Retail with tax Indep.Var. .001 .035 .0 .0
Total .0 .0 .001 .0
Figure 2
Difference in Response of Spot Gasoline
Price to Rising and Falling Price of Crude Oil
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Figure 3
Difference in Response of 
Wholesale Gasoline Price to 
Rising and Falling Price of Crude Oil
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PercentThe one anomalous response is that of
wholesale prices to changes in the spot gasoline
price (Figure 5 ). In this case, both the error-
correction model and the levels model imply
that wholesale prices respond more to a
decrease in the spot price than to an increase.
The difference is not statistically significant in
either model, however, in contrast to the F-tests
reported in Tables 3 and 4.
DIFFERENCES IN SPECIFICATION
The fact that the two models yield such
different results is puzzling. Under the null
hypothesis of no asymmetry, the two models
are identical (as the long-run restriction is not
placed on the error-correction model). The dif-
ferences arise solely in the specification of
asymmetry.
To highlight the similarities and differ-
ences of the specifications represented by
Equations 4 and 6, we create a generalized
model in which the two specifications are
nested. With some algebraic manipulation, the
generalized model can be written as
Figure 5
Difference in Response of Wholesale
Gasoline Price to Rising and Falling 
Spot Price of Gasoline
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8
levels model. For the error-correction model,
the difference in the response of the down-
stream price to an increase versus a decrease in
the upstream price is generally statistically 
significant. For the levels model, the difference
is statistically significant only in a few cases.
Furthermore, the magnitude of the asymmetry
implied by the error-correction model is several
times larger than that implied by the levels
model, particularly during the first eight weeks
following a change in the upstream price. Even
for the price pairs in which the levels model
does indicate significant asymmetry, the magni-
tude of the asymmetry is substantially smaller
than that implied by the error-correction model
(for example, see Figure 4).
For most of the error-correction models,
the asymmetry peaks one or two weeks after
the initial change in the upstream price and
then slowly dies out. When retail (both with 
and without taxes) is the downstream price, 
the asymmetry can be fairly long-lived—longer
than four months. In the few cases in which the
levels model shows asymmetry, the asymmetry
is quite persistent.
Figure 4
Difference in Response of Retail Price 
(With Tax) to Rising and Falling 
Price of Crude Oil
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Error-correction specification
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where a, bi, ci, di, fi, gi, and hi are parameters to
be estimated, and mt is a white-noise residual. 
As with Equations 4 and 6, we also include 51
weekly dummies and a time-trend variable. The
levels specification (Equation 4 ) is obtained if
the coefficients gi and hi are zero. The error-
correction specification is obtained if gi = –di
and  hi =  –fi for all i except i = 1, and dn = 0 and
fn = 0.
Unfortunately, the differences between the
models do not seem to lend themselves to
sharply diverging economic interpretations.
Consequently, we use Equation 7 to test for
asymmetry and the restrictions imposed by the
two models. Asymmetry is indicated if the coef-
ficients di, fi, gi, and hi are jointly significantly
different from zero. The restriction representing
the levels specification is rejected if the coeffi-
cients gi and hi are jointly significantly different
from zero. The restriction representing the
error-correction specification is rejected if gi =
–di and hi = –fi for all i except i = 1, and dn = 0
and fn = 0 are jointly significantly rejected.
Table 5 shows that for eight of the ten
price pairs, the restrictions implied by the levels
model are rejected, but the restrictions implied
by the error-correction model cannot be
rejected. For one pairing—spot gasoline with
retail sans tax—the restriction implied by either
model cannot be rejected. In the pairing of
wholesale with retail sans tax, the restriction
implied by the levels model cannot be rejected,
but the restriction implied by the error-correc-
tion model is rejected.
For each of the nine pairings in which one
specification seems to be preferred over the
other, the preferred model indicates asymmetry.
For the one pairing in which neither set of
restrictions can be rejected, neither model indi-
cates asymmetry. As shown by Table 6, asym-
metry tests conducted with the general model
are substantially consistent with the results from
the preferred model for each pairing.
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Table 5
Significance of Nesting Tests for Levels and 
Error-Correction Models
(Variable at left is the dependent variable)
Asymmetry Spot Retail
type Oil gasoline Wholesale without tax
Spot gasoline LM .01 — — —
ECM .06 — — —
Wholesale LM .006 .002 — —
ECM .277 .132 — —
Retail without tax LM .002 .242 .052 —
ECM .28 .592 .011 —
Retail with tax LM .0 .020 .014 .0
ECM .392 .301 .457 .143
Table 6
Significance of Asymmetry Tests for General Model
(Variable at left is the dependent variable)
Asymmetry Spot Retail
type Oil gasoline Wholesale without tax
Spot gasoline Indep.Var. .077 — — —
Total .009 — — —
Wholesale Indep.Var. .014 .013 — —
Total .004 .0 — —
Retail without tax Indep.Var. .001 .193 .034 —
Total .0 .18 .002 —
Retail with tax Indep.Var. .002 .061 .022 .0
Total .0 .002 .006 .0 Figure 6
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Asymmetry Reconsidered
We have considered two model specifica-
tions to test for asymmetry in the response of
gasoline prices to crude oil prices. Even though
the two models differ only in their specification
of asymmetry and are otherwise identical, they
yield dramatically different results. A levels
specification indicates that asymmetry is only
found in a few cases and is small. An error-
correction specification (without a long-run
restriction) indicates that asymmetry is pervasive
and large.
Unfortunately, the differences in specifica-
tion do not seem to lend themselves to eco-
nomic interpretation, which leaves us with a
statistical criterion with which to evaluate the
divergent findings. In most cases, tests with a
more general model indicate that the error-
correction model seems to fit the data better
than the levels model, which suggests that the
apparent asymmetry is one that operates on 
the rate of change in prices. If we accept the
error-correction specification and conclude that 
asymmetry is pervasive and large, however, we
must be concerned that the findings are sensi-
tive to model specification.
NOTES
While retaining responsibility for any errors or omis-
sions in the analysis, the authors thank Jim Dolmas,
Fred Joutz, Evan Koenig, Jayeong Koo, Don Norman,
and Marci Rossell for helpful comments on earlier
drafts of the paper, and Carrie Kelleher and Dong Fu
for able research assistance.
1 We conceptualize the relationship between upstream
and downstream prices as a markup model but con-
duct our estimation in levels and natural logs. Although
the results are substantially similar for both specifica-
tions, we report these results for natural logs because
that specification is scale invariant.
2 Causality tests conducted with forms of the model that
allowed for asymmetry yielded substantially similar results.
3 We use a Choleski decomposition that decomposes
the residuals m1,t and m2,t into two sets of impulses that
are orthogonal to each other. This permits the covari-
ance between the residuals to be taken into account.
The Choleski decomposition imposes a recursive
structure on the system of residuals in which the order-
ing of the residuals associated with each dependent
variable is specified. If the covariance between the
residuals is sufficiently high, the ordering can affect
the results. We found that changing the ordering had
little effect on the results, except the pairing of spot
crude oil with spot gasoline.
4 The inclusion of a contemporaneous upstream price
term raises a concern about the possibility of simul-
taneous equation bias. The upstream origin of the
shocks mitigates much of this concern, and BCG
found that failure to instrument the variable has no
appreciable effect on the results.
5 Statistical tests indicate that the seasonal dummies are
significant in all regressions and the time-trend vari-
able is significant in some regressions. Robustness
checks indicate that the seasonal dummies and the
time-trend variable have little effect on the results.
6 The presence of the dummies, Ut – i and Dt – i, pre-
vents us from rewriting the asymmetric differenced
terms as levels terms without placing restrictions on
the resulting coefficients. See Equation 7 below.
7 The differences between Equations 4 and 6 are best
seen in Equation 7 below.
8 Not all figures are presented here. The remaining 
figures are available from the authors.
9 Because the models are nonlinear, some care must 
be taken in computing these responses. For all the
responses, we consider a one-unit change in the
upstream price, given that the upstream price is 
initially equal to its sample mean. Because lagged 
values of the downstream price enter the model,
downstream prices are set equal to the steady value
implied by the model when the upstream price is
equal to its sample mean. The confidence bands are
calculated by Monte Carlo Integration. For each repli-
cation, we randomly draw the model parameters, b
~
,
from its posterior distribution, which is assumed to 
be N(b ˆ, V(b ˆ) ), where b ˆ and V(b ˆ) are the estimated
parameters and their variance-covariance matrix,
respectively. For a given realization of b
~
, we then 
calculate the responses of the downstream price to 
an increase and a decrease in the upstream price.
This is repeated 1,000 times to form the two-standard-
deviation confidence band.
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